Implementing the internal control mechanisms and disclosing their reports is one of the effective control tools in more suitable monitoring of stakeholders over the behavior and performance of managers. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between disclosure of internal control report over financial reporting, agency expenses and earnings management in listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. So, three hypotheses have been designed and tested using the data of a sample from listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2007 to 2016. The results of statistical analysis of multiple correlation models indicate that there is a significant negative relation between disclosure of internal control reports and earnings management. However, there is not a relation between earnings management and agency expenses, as well as the disclosure of internal control report and agency expenses.

In the present study, an attempt has been made to gain insight into the status of law in relation to agency costs using an analytical-descriptive method. The issue of agency costs and the urge to present regulations for the agents involved in the commercial ties between companies have been always of research value for lawyers. Such costs, if appropriate measures not taken, can create formidable barriers to the potential interests of stakeholders which eventually puts businesses and investments at jeopardy and may lead to the loss of opportunities to attract dispersed capital of the community. Since the interests of the stakeholders are based on the actions of the agents, it is possible for them to abuse their position, which would be in conflict with the fundamental purpose of the companies. Accordingly, high agency costs can generally place undue burden on the stakeholders of companies, leading to unproductivity of their institutions...

In this study, we provided survey the effect of financing policies on the agency cost in the stock exchange market of Tehran. Agency relation is an agreement, according that owner elect the person and give option to him for deicide firm's operating activity. After agency agreement, agency cost raised because of conflict interests between both of the agreement parties. Agency cost has inversing effect on the firm. Therefore the firm looks for controlling and reduce the agency cost. In this research, we defined "Q Tobin" Index to measure the agency cost. This study is applied research and its purpose is surveying the relation between financial leverage, cash dividend and debt ratio of firm's on agency cost. The society of this study is consisted of all active firms in Tehran stock exchange in duration, (1384-1388). After systematic sampling, we collecting 186 firms.In order to test the correlation between the variables, Pearson Correlation Coefficient is used. Also the result of Durbin Watson test is 1.822 and it means that there is not first order serial and on totality can reliance to results. The results show that there is no relation between financial leverage and agency cost. Also the findings show positive relation between cash dividend and agency cost. Finally the result show negative relation between debt ratio and agency cost.

In this paper, the effect of agency cost on the relationship between corporate governance and cost of equity capital is studied. The models for testing hypotheses are multivariate regression model from Chen et al (2011) study. For this purpose, the related data of the listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange was utilized from the periods 2009 to 2015, including 140 companies. The results show an inverse relationship between corporate governance and cost of equity capital. This means the companies that have better governance system, will have lower financing costs and the investors demand lower yields from them. Indeed if agency cost becomes lower, real investor has more confidence, thus more financial capital is provided for companies. Also the amount of agency costs and the investment opportunities have effect on the relationship between corporate governance and cost of equity capital.

Agency relationship, conflict of interests, and asymmetry of information have been examined and discussed in detail in more classic economic systems and corporate governance. In this paper we attempt to apply these concepts to healthcare delivery system to understand its nature and dynamics. Considering the vital role of health insurance, the nature of agency cost in various forms of insurance is examined. Finally, we suggest strategies for handling and containment of this phenomenon in health systems with any forms of insurance.

Today's competition in the market can affect many factors in companies, because competition is an effective controlling mechanism to control the agency's problems. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of the Agency cost on the value of accounting information in the competitive market. In this research, the benchmark for the measures of Agency cost includes earning management, capital structure and asset turnover ratios in the Tehran Stock Exchange. Additionally, to measure the product market competition, we used the herfindahl-hirschman Index, and for measuring accounting information, also selected a component of the financial statements, including the book value of each share and dividend payout. dividend payout are used as a benchmark for determining the benefits of each share of the entity's performance. Regression analysis is used to examine hypotheses of the study. The data set includes 90 companies accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 2010 to 2015. The findings of this research show that, if there is a competitive market for the product, the agency cost does not reduce the value of the accounting information.

Understanding how costs behave is a vital and critical issue for managers, management accountants, and financial analysts. Using agency theory, this paper addresses the empirical question of whether the management characteristics can help explain the cost stickiness as managerial behavior in the Tehran Stock Exchange. Utilizing a panel data regression model, we examined the data to determine the interaction impact of management characteristics as nonexecutive managers, managerial ability, overconfidence, and earnings management on cost stickiness of 165 firms, for the period 2009 to 2018. Results show that the entrenchment effects of non-executive managers increase the positive influences of managerial ability on overconfidence and as overconfidence increase, earnings management are also increasing consequently leads to an increase in cost stickiness. This means that when non-executive managers are excessively confident in their abilities, they are more likely to engage in opportunistic activities and earnings management. In these cases, managers report excessive cost overruns when there is a slight increase in company sales, resulting in increased cost stickiness. This study contributes by providing evidence on asymmetric cost behavior concerning management characteristics from one of the emerging economies. Further, the study extends the very few studies on the relationship between management characteristics and cost stickiness.

IntroductionCosts are the main driver of company profitability and therefore company value. Therefore, it is important to understand how cost asymmetry affects firm value, since maximizing firm value is considered the primary objective of the firm. During a sales downturn, holding stagnant resources reduces the present value of sales and increases the opportunity cost of holding unused resources, thereby reducing the firm's profitability and negatively affecting firm value. Firms with higher cost stickiness will have lower profits because cost stickiness causes less inventory adjustment when sales decline. This further reduction in profit when activity levels decrease increases the variability of the profit distribution, resulting in lower profit forecasts. Firms with stickier costs have less analyst coverage, and investors rely less on the realized earnings of such firms due to their lower predictive power. Cost stickiness has been shown to increase credit risk. This increase in credit risk leads to an increase in costs and a decrease in profit, which leads to a decrease in the value of the company.Two currents that increase the intensity of cost stickiness are resource adjustment costs and agency problems. When the demand decreases, the manager can adjust the company's resources according to the changes in the demand level, but this creates adjustment costs, such as the adjustment costs related to labor and equipment. In fact, companies are forced to bear adjustment costs in order to set aside resources and replace the same resources if the demand returns to the original situation. Adjustment costs include such things as compensation for laid-off employees and the costs of searching and training new employees. The authority of the management to determine the level of resources, when the demand decreases, is one of the factors of creating the stickiness of the costs related to these resources. The cost of resource adjustment affects the degree of cost stickiness.The agency problem occurs due to the mismatch of interests between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers). One consequence of the agency problem is that managers who engage in empire-building activities over represent the firm by retaining unused resources in order to gain base, power, compensation, and prestige. For example, overinvestment in labor (over-hiring or under-firing) can result from managers' desire to engage in empire-building activities while retaining low-performing projects. According to previous literature on agency theory, unused resources are conserved because managers obtain monetary and non-monetary benefits from managing large and complex organizations and try to avoid difficult and time-consuming decisions about discarding unused resources.  Therefore, companies that have a specific agency problem have more opportunities to sell costs in operational costs such as administrative costs, which lead to cost stickiness and intensify the effect of it. Cost stickiness is one of the factors affecting the value of the firm, which can be caused by resource adjustment costs or agency problems, and this was the main motivation of this study.  HypothesesAccording to the theoretical foundations and objectives of the research, the hypotheses of the research are as follows:H1: Cost stickiness has a negative effect on firm value.H2: The resource adjustment cost increases the intensity of the cost stickiness effect on the firm's value.H3: Agency problems increase the intensity of cost stickiness effect on firm value.  MethodThe statistical population of this study are all companies listed in Tehran Stock Market, in which 102 companies in the period 2013 to 2022 have been selected by systematic elimination method. For data analysis and hypothesis testing, multivariate regression model based on compound data is used.  ResultThe research results showed that cost stickiness has a negative effect on firm value. Also, the findings showed that when the resource adjustment cost is high, the effect of cost stickiness on the value of the firm increases. In addition, agency problems do not affect the relationship between costs and firm value.  Discussion and Conclusion This study, therefore, provides insight and understanding into how managers’ deliberate resource adjustment decisions affect overall financial health and firm value. Perhaps managers need to be more transparent about their resource adjustment decisions, so that investors can incorporate both resource adjustment costs and managerial expectations of future demand, when doing risk assessments related to their investment decisions. Keywords: Firm Value, Cost Stickiness, Resource Adjustment Cost, Agency Problem.  

The cost of capital is one of the most important and effective financial tools in making many management and investment decisions that are affected by several factors. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of two key factors of earning quality and voluntary disclosure on the cost of capital by considering the mediating role of agency costs using structural equation modeling. The research is of the quantitative and causal type, and in terms of the implementation method, it is in the correlation category, and based on the purpose, it is of the applied type. A statistical sample from the population of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange including 174 companies during the period 2015-2020 has been selected based on the method of systematic elimination. Due to the normality of the collected data, the asymptotic free distribution (ADF) method has been used to estimate the model which makes it possible to investigate the direct and indirect relationships among the variables. The effect of indirect happens when the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable is passed on by the intermediary variable. In the present research, agency cost is placed as an intermediary variable between two independent variables (quality of earning and discretionary disclosure) and a dependent variable (cost of capital) and causes an indirect relationship between them. By considering the direct and indirect path between the studied variables, the test result obtained a positive and significant relationship between agency costs and capital costs. The results also show that earning quality does not directly affect on the cost of capital, but indirectly hurts the cost of capital due to agency costs. The effect of total earning quality on capital cost is significant and negative. Also, the direct effect of discretionary disclosure on the cost of capital is not significant, while the indirect effect and its total effect on the cost of capital due to agency costs are negative and significant.